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ABSTRACT
There is a gap in IR and EU scholarship concerning unintended
consequences in an international context, leaving this important
phenomenon understudied. To ﬁll this gap, a conceptualisation of
unintended consequences is oﬀered, and a set of common
research questions are presented, highlighting the nature (what),
the causes (why) and the modes of management (how) of unin-
tended consequences of EU external action. The Special Issue
contributes to the study of the EU as an international actor by
broadening the notion of the EU’s impact abroad to include the
unintended consequences of EU (in)actions and by shedding new
light on the conceptual paradigms that explain EU external action.
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In international relations (IR), unintended consequences are abundant, but mostly go
unstudied. Although various IR theories allow for unintended consequences in one way
or another, systematic explorations of unintended consequences as such in IR and
international studies more generally are rare. Edited publications on unintended con-
sequences of peacekeeping operations (Aoi et al. 2007), international security govern-
ance (Daase and Friesendorf 2010), migration law and policy (Dickie et al. 2016) and
international development cooperation (Koch and Schulpen 2018) are only exceptions.
Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has emerged as an ambitious and active global
force. The studies of EU external action, however, are still mostly focused on its sui
generis character (and so somewhat detached from broader IR scholarship) and much
less on the consequences of its actions. The mainstream literature frames EU external
performance in terms of success or failure to achieve the intended eﬀects (usually
deﬁned on the basis of the EU’s own declared objectives). Resting on a deeply
embedded and uncritical liberal assumption that EU engagement abroad is a good
thing, these analyses are framed as ‘positive impact or no impact’, reducing the study of
EU impact to what is essentially a study of EU eﬀectiveness and neglecting frequent,
multiple and varied unintended eﬀects of EU policies (Burlyuk 2017, 1009-1010). The
empirical reality, however, suggests that EU external action often changes matters in
unintended ways, pushing the notion of unintended consequences to the forefront and
begging for a revision of our models for analysing and assessing EU impact.
The lack of research on unintended consequences is striking. While unintended eﬀects
have been addressed occasionally in the context of the EU’s internal policies (e.g. Allwood
et al. 2013; Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Murphy 2013; Pierson 1996; Reichert 2010) and
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external policies (Boerzel and Pamuk 2012; Martens and Wolf 2009; Stevens 2006), no
comprehensive studies have been conducted so far. Moreover, when not omitted alto-
gether, the concept of unintended consequences is used by IR and EU scholars casually,
without much methodological or conceptual rigour. While the term ‘unintended con-
sequences’ is self-explanatory and refers to outcomes of purposive action(s) that are not
directly intended by an actor, its standard meaning today has been reduced to unwelcome
unanticipated policy outcomes – an extremely partial understanding of the concept
reﬂecting but one of its possible variations. In an earlier publication, Olga Burlyuk (co-
editor of this issue) makes a plea for (re)introducing the notion of unintended conse-
quences into our understanding of impact abroad and putting it ﬁrmly, and indeed
urgently, on the scholarly research agenda (Burlyuk 2017).
This Special Issue seeks to help close these three clear analytical gaps. The objective is
thus to oﬀer a systematic analysis of the concept of unintended consequences in
international relations using the case of EU external action. Owing to its hybrid nature,
combining features of an international organisation and a state, the EU oﬀers
a particularly interesting and fruitful setting for examining the multiple manifestations
of unintended consequences in an international context, making the ﬁndings of this
issue relevant to scholars and policymakers of international organisations, states and the
EU itself.
To address the gaps in knowledge identiﬁed above, we have formulated three guiding
questions for this Special Issue:
● What are the diverse manifestations of unintended consequences in various func-
tional domains of EU external policies?
● Why do these unintended consequences occur?
● How are these unintended consequences managed by the actor concerned in the
international context?
The remainder of this Introduction is organised as follows: after a discussion of the
baseline conceptualisation of unintended consequences from which this collective
investigation departed, and the ‘sampling for diversity’ of the contributions, we elabo-
rate on the ﬁndings and the contribution the issue makes to the study of unintended
consequences (in international relations) and the EU as an international actor.
What’s in a name: a baseline conceptualisation of unintended
consequences
To approach the ‘what’ question formulated above, this project departed from a shared
baseline conceptualisation of unintended consequences as found in the literature on
unintended consequences in sociology and beyond, and as synthesized for the purposes
of IR and EU studies by Burlyuk (2017). Fundamentally, this conceptualisation chal-
lenges the standard understanding of unintended consequences as unwelcome unanti-
cipated eﬀects which, we argue, reﬂects only one of the concept’s possible variations.
At the most general level, the concept-and-term unintended consequences refers to
outcomes of purposive action(s) that are not directly intended by an actor. As argued
elsewhere, when unpacked, unintended consequences may vary with respect to (at least)
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nine parameters, including: mode of knowledgeability, relationship to the initial intention,
value attached, type of action, strength of causal links, type of outcome, who is impacted by
it, mode of acknowledgement and, ﬁnally, the temporal dimension (for a detailed discus-
sion see Burlyuk 2017, 1011-1017). Several of these analytical categories fall victim to their
seemingly self-evident nature, and their casual use breeds conceptual conﬂation. It is the
aim of this Special Issue to advance conceptual clarity with regard to unintended con-
sequences. Below we focus on the dimensions that appear to be most challenging analyti-
cally or methodologically.
First of all, establishing intention so as to label something unintended is admittedly
a challenging task, because an action’s purpose is not always clear-cut or explicit and
may be continuously reassessed (Baert 1991, 202; Merton 1936, 896). Moreover, it is
often more appropriate to speak of multiple or composite intentions guiding one’s
action. Intention, or the actual purpose of a given action, “is, in practice, almost
impossible to ascribe” (Buckland 2010, 138). A number of proxies for intention can
be used, actor’s stated objectives being the most obvious and readily available one.
Needless to say, however, when studying a political actor in an international context,
one has to be wary not to take political declarations and policy documents at face value.
They have to be problematized, for example, by clarifying stated intentions, probing
hidden intentions in interviews, or unpacking ‘collective intention’ into constitutive
(and possibly conﬂicting) intents of the respective sub-actors (a particularly pertinent
exercise in the case of a complex actor like the EU). Interviewing and process-tracing
may thus be instrumental in studying unintended consequences. Importantly, taking
stated objectives as a reference for intention so as to delineate which of the conse-
quences of one’s action were intended and which were not is principally diﬀerent from
taking stated objectives as a reference for eﬀects so as to delineate one’s impact. The
latter approach ignores all eﬀects of one’s action that do not fulﬁl stated objectives and
thus reduces the study of impact to the study of eﬀectiveness, neglecting large parts of
empirical reality.
The most important dimension – and the one for which there is clearly the most
misunderstanding and conﬂation with regard to unintended consequences – is the
mode of knowledgeability. ‘Unintended’ in unintended consequences stands for not
intended, that is: not within the purpose for which an action was undertaken.
Unintended should thus not be confused with unanticipated or unforeseen. While an
unintended consequence can be unanticipated in instances when an actor did not
foresee it at all (which is the standard understanding and most frequent usage), it can
also be anticipated in instances when an actor foresees the possibility of this outcome
but follows through with the initial action and intention nonetheless (which is arguably
the variation of unintended consequences most frequently observed in politics and
international relations, and prominent in the contributions to this issue). The key
message here is that unintended consequences are not by deﬁnition unknown to the
actor undertaking the action (Baert 1991, 201; Burlyuk 2017, 1013). Consequences that
are both unintended and anticipated are a real category of the phenomenon, and
arguably the most interesting and least studied in IR and EU studies.
Similarly, when it comes to the value attached to an unintended consequence by the
actor undertaking the action, the target of the action or a third party, it is important to
remember that unintended consequences are not axiologically negative: “undesired
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eﬀects are not always undesirable eﬀects” (Merton 1936, 895). An unintended outcome
may be desirable (beneﬁcial), undesirable (detrimental) or neutral, depending on the
value attached to it by the actor and others (Baert 1991, 204; Burlyuk 2017, 1013;
Kohstall 2010, 10). Although negative unintended consequences are more in the public
eye and may rightfully be the more intriguing analytical variation to study, it is
important to remember that positive unintended consequences may seem less interest-
ing but often prove to be no less signiﬁcant.
The value attached to an unintended consequence (positive/negative) together with
the mode of knowledgeability about it (anticipated/unanticipated), when combined,
produce four variations of unintended consequences: positive anticipated, positive
unanticipated, negative anticipated and negative unanticipated.1 As noted earlier, the
term unintended consequences is almost exclusively associated with this last type:
negative unanticipated. Yet it is just one of the four possible variations of the concept.
In fact, it is unintended consequences which are both negative and anticipated that are
particularly interesting to study, because they make one engage with the ethical
dimension of policymaking and address the dilemmas an actor faces in this regard.
As problematized by de Zwart (2015, 294), since anticipated unintended consequences
often concern politically sensitive and otherwise controversial issues, “the connotation
‘unanticipated’ that sticks to ‘unintended’ makes it possible to expose, discuss, or
correct such issues without imputing blame or getting into painful discussions about
responsibility”. De Zwart concludes that “the distinction between intention and antici-
pation is clearly a question in ethics”: why, given the foreseen risks, do policymakers
choose to go ahead anyway (295)? Likewise, positive unintended consequences, both
anticipated and unanticipated, are mostly ignored in policy discussions, yet policies can
sometimes bring bonuses and windfalls that were not factored into the initial policy
designs.
Another analytical clariﬁcation in order here relates to the relationship of an
unintended consequence to the initial intention. While the term unintended conse-
quences is associated commonly with outcomes that frustrate one’s intention, an
unintended consequence may just as well fulﬁl the intention behind an action or have
altogether no eﬀect thereon (Baert 1991, 24; Burlyuk 2017, 1014; Kohstall 2010, 10). For
example, one can have an unintended consequence that is deemed negative by the actor
and yet fulﬁls the actor’s initial intention. An important implication of this considera-
tion is that having unintended consequences is analytically distinct from failing to
achieve intended consequences, and thus the two must not be conﬂated. Failure to
reach intended consequences may well entail some unintended ones, just as unintended
consequences may frustrate the initial intention and so lead to failure to achieve
intended eﬀects, but not inevitably so. Unintended consequences may reinforce the
action and so facilitate the achievement of intended consequences, or they may backﬁre
or lead to consequences that are altogether unrelated to the initial intention. Similarly,
the study of unintended consequences must not be conﬂated with the study of policy
failure or the usual policy critique.
Just as unintended consequences are not necessarily unanticipated or undesirable, they are
not necessarily consequences for the actor undertaking the action (as is generally implied).
1We are thankful to the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this taxonomy.
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With regard to who is impacted, one can distinguish between unintended consequences that
aﬀect the actor itself, those who are targeted by the action and third parties (Burlyuk 2017,
1015; Merton 1936, 895). One can thus speak of internal unintended consequences
(with impact on the actor undertaking the action) and external unintended consequences
(with impact on those targeted by the action or third parties). This internal/external con-
sideration is relevant for identifying unintended consequences in the ﬁrst place, as well as for
analysing howpolicymakers prepare themselves for consequences they anticipate, and react to
those they do not. In addition to such ‘individual eﬀects’, unintended consequences can also
produce systemic or aggregate eﬀects at the level of the social (in our case, political, interna-
tional) system (Baert 1991, 203-204).
Finally, unintended consequences may have stronger or weaker causal links to the
action and the actor (Jervis 1997/1998; Schneckener 2010). This is not to suggest that
causal links are unimportant: on the contrary, it is crucial to maintain a clear distinction
between consequences (as eﬀects that are causally connected to the policy action under
study) and external shocks (as events that may have signiﬁcant impact on the outcome
under study but are not a consequence of the policy action under consideration). To
put it simply, consequences are to be distinguished from comets.2 Causal mechanisms
may be vague, ambiguous and subject to narration, so it is the responsibility of the
scholar to present a compelling story of the causal link between the action and what is
claimed to be and is studied as its consequence.
The fact that analysing unintended consequences comes with a set of methodological
challenges and is often regarded as “a troublesome undertaking” (Zingerle 1998, 184)
does not justify abandoning the task altogether. On the contrary, it means that scholars
have to be extra rigorous. In fact, the diﬃculties in ascribing intent, attributing intent to
action, linking action to actor and outcome to action, which are all too often mentioned
as reasons to dismiss the idea of analysing unintended consequences, are just as
pertinent to the study of intended consequences as they are to the study of the
unintended. Just as some 80 years ago, when Robert Merton wrote these words, the
puzzle “must be solved for every empirical case which is studied” (Merton 1936, 897).
As for the causes behind unintended consequences, or the ‘why’ question asked in
this Special Issue, the unintended consequences literature rests on assumptions about
the world’s inherent complexity and inevitable cognitive and emotional biases and,
accordingly, attributes unintended consequences to ignorance, error, imperious imme-
diacy of interests, basic values, self-defeating predictions (Merton 1936; 1948), as well as
willingness to risk, indiﬀerence (to possible future harm) and contextual change
(Almondo 1998; Burlyuk 2017, 1015-1017; de Zwart 2015, 295; Vernon 1979, 68).
Authors in this issue use these basic explanatory factors as a starting point and further
explore literature in the broader ﬁeld of IR to give a more solid conceptual grounding to
the explanation of their speciﬁc cases.
As for the modes of managing unintended consequences, or the ‘how’ dimension of
this study, the unintended consequences literature has done little so far to systematise
the ways in which actors respond to the unintended consequences of their actions or act
in anticipation of them. By engaging with the how question throughout the issue, and
by asking the how question alongside the what and the why questions, this Special Issue
2We owe this analogy to the anonymous reviewer.
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makes an original contribution to the study of unintended consequences (as such, and
IR/EU studies in particular) and devises a classiﬁcation of the modes of managing
unintended consequences that can be used in further research on the subject (more on
this below).
What’s in the Special Issue: sampling for diversity
In soliciting contributions for this issue, we sampled for diversity with regard to analytical
variations of unintended consequences under study, functional domains of EU external
action and targeted geographic areas (partner states, groups of states or regions).
With respect to the variation in the types of unintended consequences, contributions
in this Special Issue explore positive and negative unintended consequences, anticipated
and unanticipated unintended consequences, unintended consequences stemming from
the EU’s action and inaction (recognising failure to act as a form of action), and
unintended consequences that aﬀect the EU, the targets of its policies and third parties.
Some articles identify and analyse unintended consequences of an EU policy in
a speciﬁc domain at a more general level (De Ville and Gheyle; Reslow; Kourtelis;
and Dandashly and Noutcheva3), while others unpack unintended consequences in
concrete cases (Carbone; Casier; Bouris). Some examine unintended consequences that
have happened (De Ville and Gheyle; Reslow; Bouris; Dandashly and Noutcheva). Some
study the unintended consequences of the policies (Reslow; Kourtelis; Bouris;
Dandashly and Noutcheva) while others study policies as unintended consequences
(Carbone; Casier).
In terms of policy areas, articles examine instances of unintended consequences of
EU neighbourhood and enlargement policies, speciﬁcally with regard to democratisa-
tion (Dandashly and Noutcheva) and state-building (Bouris), EU external (rural)
development (Carbone; Kourtelis), trade (De Ville and Gheyle), migration (Reslow),
EU diplomacy and negotiations with (groups of) third states (De Ville and Gheyle;
Carbone), CSDP missions (Bouris) and foreign policy as such (Casier).
The geography of contributions stretches from EU-US (De Ville and Gheyle) and
EU-Russia (Casier) relations, through EU relations with the eastern and southern
neighbourhoods (Dandashly and Noutcheva), and speciﬁcally the Arab Mediterranean
(Kourtelis) and Israel-Palestine (Bouris) to Africa (Reslow), in particular the African,
Caribbean and Paciﬁc Group of States (Carbone).
Such analytical and empirical breadth and depth of the topics guarantees a wide
appeal for IR and EU scholars and policymakers and strengthens the study’s compara-
tive dimension, even though it was not designed for the purpose of comparison as such.
While authors were free to choose the theoretical and methodological lenses best suited
to their studies, all contributions are united by the empirical phenomenon in focus
(unintended consequences of EU external action) and the three guiding research
questions (the what, why and how). Furthermore, they all departed from the shared
baseline understanding of unintended consequences discussed above. The ﬁndings of
this Special Issue thus make important contributions to the literature on unintended
consequences in general and unintended consequences in IR/EU external action in
3When the reference is without a date, it is to an article contained in this Special Issue.
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particular and to the literature on the EU as an international actor (summarised below),
as well as to (sub)literature on the policy areas and/or cases examined (discussed in
individual articles).
Contribution to the study of unintended consequences
First, the contributions in this Special Issue reveal that unintended consequences can
result not only from purposive action, as the baseline conceptualisation of unintended
consequences discussed above put it (what), but also from purposive inaction (Casier;
Bouris; Dandashly and Noutcheva). Purposiveness, intentionality, awareness of one’s
act (be it action or inaction), the fact that it “involves motives and consequently
a choice between various alternatives” (Merton 1936, 895), “the want” at the moment
of carrying out the act (Baert 1991, 201), are the decisive criteria. The study of
(international actors’/the EU’s) inaction, indecision, non-policy thus emerges as
a ﬁeld for further investigation, adding an entirely new dimension of empirical reality
to the research agenda. At the very least, it pushes scholars to engage in policy analysis
that goes beyond policy decisions as recorded in policy documents.
Second, in their own way all contributions to this Special Issue advance an under-
standing of unintended consequences as a process: not only can policies generate
unintended consequences (Casier; Bouris; Dandashly and Noutcheva), but existing or
anticipated unintended consequences can also drive or generate policies (Reslow;
Carbone; Kourtelis). Unintended consequences can even trigger further unintended
consequences (De Ville and Gheyle; Casier). A notion of ﬁrst-order and second-order
unintended consequences is proposed in this regard to capture and reﬂect the causal
and temporal distance between one’s (in)action and the unintended eﬀects it triggers
(De Ville and Gheyle). This begs for non-linear scholarly accounts of (EU) policies and
their eﬀects that view the two as parts of one dynamic process rather than strictly
sequential steps. It also invites analyses that consider interactions at all levels: across
(sub)actors, for example, between the EU, its partners and third states (Casier;
Dandashly and Noutcheva) or within the EU itself (Reslow; Carbone); across policy
areas, acknowledging and exploring linkages between diﬀerent functional domains
(Reslow; Carbone) and between internal and external policy levels (Reslow); across
time, with learning from the past (Kourtelis); and, ﬁnally, across space, with learning
from others and others learning from you.
Third, contributions in this Special Issue suggest that the unintended consequences
of policies (and speciﬁcally international policies) are often or, at least, can often be
anticipated (De Ville and Gheyle; Reslow; Kourtelis). This entails that unintended
consequences are not only and not so much about knowing or not knowing the possible
eﬀects of one’s (in)action as they are about one’s political and ethical choices. In some
instances, policy decisions are clearly a result of weighing oﬀ against each other the
diﬀerent sets of consequences an actor anticipates (Reslow). With regard to unintended
consequences that are both anticipated and desirable (positive), the question then
becomes: at what point do these cease being unintended and become intended
(Reslow)? In turn, the question with regard to unintended consequences that are
undesirable (negative) is whether and why these have been “foreseeable but not fore-
seen, or foreseen but neglected or discounted or risked” (Vernon 1979, 61). The matters
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of the politics and ethics of policies – and their intended as well as unintended
consequences – are in urgent need of further exploration in EU studies and interna-
tional studies more generally.
Fourth, with respect to the causes of unintended consequences (why), contributions in
this issue trace the drivers of unintended consequence to a plurality of factors. This Special
Issue departs from the explanatory variables suggested by sociological scholarship (such as
error, ignorance, interests, values, self-fulﬁlling prophecy, risk, indiﬀerence and contextual
change), ‘domesticates’ these insights in the discipline of political science and anchors them
more ﬁrmly in conceptual paradigms established in the IR/EU ﬁelds (more on this in the
following section).While some analyses engage with the above categories comprehensively,
entertaining all of them as possible explanations (De Ville and Gheyle; Kourtelis; Bouris),
others do so in a more selective or adapted manner as required by their research objectives
(Reslow; Carbone; Casier; Dandashly and Noutcheva). Notably, in one way or another all
contributions support the assertion of unintended consequences literature that a plurality
of causes are at work in each given case and consider this (highly) applicable to an
international relations context. In this way, we acknowledge the complexity of social
phenomena and join the chorus of voices that have embraced analytical eclecticism as
a method of inquiry in world politics (Cornut 2014; Sil and Katzenstein 2010).
Finally, this Special Issue is among the ﬁrst scholarly eﬀorts to engage systematically with
the question of how actors manage the unintended consequences their policies have caused
or may cause. The contributions reveal that the mode of managing unintended conse-
quencesmay vary depending on the policy context. It is fair to say that the management of
unintended consequences requires a degree of acknowledgement that such eﬀects occur or
may occur in the future. We have identiﬁed two important markers of the variety of
management strategies that actors resort to. When faced with unintended consequences
or the prospect of unintended consequences of policies, policymakers have to decide, ﬁrst,
what value they attach to them. In other words, the policy response is conditioned by the
judgement made with respect to whether the unintended consequences are seen as positive,
negative or neutral. This is a dynamic process in which policymakers assess the magnitude
of the unintended eﬀects, the party experiencing the unintended eﬀects and the possibility
of shifting perceptions of policy eﬀects in time. This decision, in turn, conditions whether
policymakers wish to see these unintended eﬀects mitigated or reinforced.
A second important aspect of decision-making involves choosing whether to change
policy so as to address its unintended eﬀects or continue with the existing policy and thus
embrace those unintended eﬀects. The decision to act or not to act is also complex in nature
and depends on the desirability of the unintended policy outcomes, the costs of action or
inaction, and the ethics of prioritising one course of action over another, among other
situational factors. The judgement about these parameters will inevitably evolve over time
alongside policymakers’ willingness and ability to change the policy or not.
Contribution to the study of the EU as an international actor
Multiple manifestations
Unintended consequences in IR and EU external action are ubiquitous. Our Special
Issue supports the initial hunch behind this collective investigation with evidence from
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a variety of EU policy areas and bilateral and multilateral relationships. The fact that the
authors have (rather easily) found examples of unintended consequences in their
respective ﬁelds of expertise once again conﬁrms that unintended consequences are
there, are many and diverse, and are waiting to be examined. The need to integrate
unintended consequences in our scholarly and policy notions of ‘impact’ and respective
research/policy agendas is thus truly pressing.
Not only are unintended consequences of EU external action abundant but they are
also diverse in nature. An important ﬁnding of this issue is that most of the unintended
consequences of EU external (in)action uncovered by the contributors were anticipated.
The fact that unintended consequences occur despite their predictability raises further
questions about the reasons for allowing them to manifest themselves. While the
majority of unintended consequences addressed in this Special Issue were negative,
quite a few have a positive value attached to them from the point of view of the EU as
a whole (De Ville and Gheyle), diﬀerent institutional actors within the EU (Reslow) or
third parties outside the EU (Reslow; Carbone).
Another signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that the EU is likely to recognise the unintended con-
sequences of its policies and this, in theory, lays the ground for active management of them.
Furthermore, unintended consequences that aﬀect actors other than the EU or the system
as such – described as ‘external eﬀects’ in some contributions (Reslow; Casier; Dandashly
and Noutcheva) – are encountered far more frequently than ‘internal eﬀects’, which raises
the importance of the ethical dimension of EU external (in)action. In any case, the
contributions consider not only the external eﬀects of EU external policies (Kourtelis;
Bouris; Dandashly and Noutcheva), but also the internal eﬀects of EU external policies
(Reslow; Carbone; Casier) as well as the external eﬀects of EU internal policies (De Ville and
Gheyle; Reslow).
Multiple causes
Unintended consequences have not only multiple manifestations but also multiple
causes. We contribute to the literature on the EU’s international role by opening up
the conceptual debate about the sources of EU external action and by going beyond the
unproductive dichotomy of interests versus values which has dominated explanatory
accounts of the EU’s external actorness till now. Some have insisted on the traditional
state-like features of the EU and attributed its external actions to a conventional
conception of interests, portraying it in either realist (Hyde-Price 2006) or liberal
(Smith 2011) terms. Others have gone beyond the rationalist paradigm and highlighted
the normative fundamentals of the EU’s external posture, conceptualising the EU as
a normative power and debating the extent to which the EU can make a normative
diﬀerence in world aﬀairs (Diez 2013; Manners 2002; Sjursen 2006; Whitman 2013).
Inherent in this debate is the discussion about whether the EU is an actor like any other
or a sui generis entity that is bound to have a unique imprint on the global scene.
While we recognise the importance of these fundamental motivations of external
policy, we focus on less studied drivers of external action reaching out to literature
outside the EU mainstream. Although authors were free to engage with theories of their
choice, the contributions in this Special Issue fall within one (or more) of three
perspectives that have proven fruitful in providing alternative accounts of unintended
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eﬀects of external action: risk, bureaucracy and policy learning. As these come from
broader non-EU speciﬁc literature, they can be applied to the external actions of various
players in an international context.
Firstly, the literature on risk has informed our understanding of how risk judge-
ments interfere in establishing hierarchies of anticipated unintended consequences and
how ethics form an integral part of the decisions to tolerate anticipated undesired
eﬀects or not (De Ville and Gheyle; Kourtelis; Bouris). This is a fundamental insight
that moves the scholarly debate beyond rational choice paradigms and into the realm of
scholarship emphasizing risk and how risk shapes decisions, policies and society more
broadly (Beck 1992). While mainstream rational approaches conceptualise decision-
making as a cost-beneﬁt calculation with preconceived notions of what constitutes
a gain or a loss, risk-based accounts capture the complexity of decision-making when
trade-oﬀs between various courses of actions exist and when those policy alternatives
carry diﬀerent risks of undesired eﬀects (Webb 2018). Decisions are not simply
reasoned in terms of gains and losses, but involve an interaction between the risk
assessments of policy outcomes, the ethical positions of policymakers and the anticipa-
tion of undesirable unintended consequences (De Ville and Gheyle; Kourtelis; Bouris).
The EU is in this sense presented as an entity making conscious choices about the
unintended consequences of policies it will tolerate, which, in turn, have serious ethical
implications for its international reputation (De Zwart 2015). This sheds new light on
debates about the EU’s ethical power which have focused exclusively on the extent to
which the EU’s actions are self-regarding or take the interests and values of the parties
receiving EU policy into account (Aggestam 2008). A risk perspective suggests that the
ethics of EU power may have to do with the weight the EU places on diﬀerent foreign
policy goals and how it judges the desirability of those goals in time and their potential
to trigger diﬀerent types of unintended consequences for diﬀerent actors.
Secondly, the literature on the ‘pathologies of international organisations’ provides
another alternative prism through which unintended consequences are viewed as the
outcome of dysfunctional bureaucratic behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As
a dense institutional environment, the EU may be particularly prone to errors and
misjudgements linked to the very nature of its bureaucracy. The obsession with internal
rules and procedures, as well as the compartmentalisation of expertise across various
institutional units, increases the danger of misreading and responding inadequately to
the global and local contexts in which external action is taken (Reslow; Casier;
Dandashly and Noutcheva). In spite of its highly professional bureaucracy, the EU is
not unaccustomed to artiﬁcially copy-pasting templates, policy tools and solutions from
one context to another, counting on previous successes while neglecting the speciﬁcity
of new environments (Kourtelis).
Importantly, the administrative governance of overtly politicised dossiers with geostrategic
implications may carry particular risks of unintended consequences in an international
context (Dandashly and Noutcheva). Technocratic approaches are well known to rely on
an internal logic of policymaking that may ignore the intensity of preferences of third actors
and fail to anticipate their reactions. The dysfunctional bureaucratic logic thus brings in a new
perspective on the EU foreign policy bureaucracy which has mostly been examined through
the positive input of its unelected oﬃcials and their subtle yet inﬂuential role in setting the
EU’s foreign policy agenda (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). The bureaucratic
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propensity for self-defeating behaviour suggests that unintended consequences are inherent
in the way in which the Brussels bureaucracy functions and produces policy output with
external implications.
A particular variant of this perspective looks at the role of politics in decisions
related to external action and conceives of unintended consequences as the outcome of
internal dynamics that juxtapose diﬀerent foreign policy objectives within and across
institutions and within and across diﬀerent layers of governance. This is especially
relevant for the EU which is a complex decision-making system in which intergovern-
mental and supranational elements of policy-making intersect at diﬀerent moments of
the policy cycle, in addition to the usual challenges of cross-sectoral policy coordination
of every state administration. EU scholars have discussed at length the problem of
coherence in EU foreign policymaking and how it often leads to the EU’s suboptimal
external performance (Carbone 2013; Gebhard 2017).
We go a step further by showing how the competing objectives of diﬀerent policy
sectors, as well as the propensity of EU internal policies to have external eﬀects, can
produce unintended consequences for diﬀerent stakeholders in this complex policy-
making system (Reslow; Carbone; Dandashly and Noutcheva). We ﬁnd that this
cacophony of relationships between member states and the EU, between supranational
and intergovernmental modes of governance, between inter- and intra-institutional
interactions within each domain of external action is a powerful source of unintended
consequences of EU external action. Various contributions provide detailed evidence of
how they play out in diﬀerent policy domains.
Thirdly, the literature on policy learning oﬀers another analytical angle through
which unintended consequences can be studied (Bennett and Howlett 1992). In prin-
ciple, the EU can learn from its past mistakes by adapting its own policy script, but the
process of acknowledging the unintended eﬀects of one’s policies is fundamentally
challenging (Kourtelis; Casier; Bouris). The main insight of the scholarship on policy
learning relevant for the discussion here is that institutional actors are able to acknowl-
edge and anticipate the unintended consequences of policy initiatives and can use this
knowledge strategically to sway future policies in a preferred direction (De Ville and
Gheyle; Carbone; Biedenkopf 2018; Koch 2018). Politics is at the core of this process,
where advocacy coalitions within or outside the EU institutional environment can
instrumentalise a narrative on unintended consequences in order to justify a policy
change or initiate a new policy on the grounds that it reduces the likelihood of future
unintended consequences. Unintended consequences can thus be politicised and used
strategically by actors in their internal institutional and policy battles (De Ville and
Gheyle; Carbone). A policy learning perspective thus oﬀers new insights into how the
occurrence of unintended consequences can in itself become the cause of policy change,
bringing in a transgovernmental aspect of policymaking and emphasising the impor-
tance of agency in constructing a narrative on unintended consequences that can be
harnessed for the purposes of policy entrepreneurship.
These three perspectives are not exhaustive in terms of conceptual accounts of
unintended consequences. For example, none of the contributions to this Special
Issue borrow insights from the various approaches to foreign policymaking grounded
in political psychology, such as groupthink or cybernetic decision-making, which could
potentially provide points of departure for further conceptual exploration. Nevertheless,
THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 11
the three perspectives emphasized by the contributions, combined with a sensitivity to
the plurality of causes at work discussed in the previous section, make it possible to
overcome the unproductive dichotomies of norms versus interests, values versus secur-
ity, etc. that have characterised much of the mainstream EU scholarship. The Special
Issue thereby contributes to a growing body of research that engages pragmatically with
conceptual paradigms to construct complex causal narratives while remaining closer to
the problems policymakers face on a daily basis.
Multiple strategies
There are various ways in which actors can manage the unintended consequences of
their policies, and this Special Issue makes a particular contribution to this subject not
addressed systematically in previous scholarship. Our study uncovers considerable
variations in how the EU manages unintended consequences, allowing us to draw
parallels across policy sectors and partners; although a rigorous comparison and
explanation of the variations observed is beyond the scope of this issue. What deter-
mines the exact choice of management strategy is an interesting question but one that
needs to be addressed in future research. Our study, a ﬁrst attempt at classifying EU
responses to the unintended consequences of its policies, generates far more interesting
questions that it can answer. It does, however, suggest a few avenues for further
exploration.
The contributions to the Special Issue ﬁnd that the EU is at times a reactive and at
times a pro-active manager of unintended consequences. In some cases where the EU
was able to anticipate undesirable eﬀects of default policies, it adopted a pro-active
approach, such as in the negotiations of a new legally binding EU-ACP partnership
(Carbone). In other cases where undesirable unintended consequences could have been
anticipated but the EU failed to connect the dots, it chose to be inactive and stick to its
‘business as usual’ approach, such as in its policies vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries
(Kourtelis; Dandashly and Noutcheva). There have also been instances in which the EU
has produced unintended consequences for third parties (Casier). In such cases, man-
agement of the unintended eﬀects of EU policies has also been inﬂuenced by the agency
of the third actors concerned and their reactions to the EU’s policies (Casier).
A speciﬁc marker of the EU’s approach to management of unintended consequences
is the strength of its legal competences and institutional mandate in speciﬁc domains of
external action. In the area of trade policy, for example, in which the EU has exclusive
competence and enjoys a very strong institutional mandate, it has shown itself to be
a daring actor, initiating substantive policy change in the aftermath of the failure of the
TTIP negotiations (De Ville and Gheyle). This has not been the case in the migration
policy ﬁeld, where the fragmented nature of decision-making and the constrained
mandate of the EU institutional layer make it impossible for the EU to show strong
leadership in tackling unintended consequences (Reslow). A similar conclusion emerges
in the area of democracy promotion, where the EU institutional establishment is not in
a position to drive substantive policy change without the consensual backing of EU
member states (Dandashly and Noutcheva). Furthermore, in the area of state-building,
where sensitivities are very high and EU member states are in the driver’s seat, the EU is
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in a very weak position and reluctant to admit that its interventions can have unin-
tended consequences, let alone actively manage them (Bouris).
In choosing what management strategy to adopt, at times the EU also faces ethical
dilemmas that involve weighing oﬀ the diﬀerent unintended consequences and the
eﬀects they have on the EU and the other parties (Reslow). Aware that it is impossible
to eliminate unintended consequences as a category and that it is a political actor’s job
to anticipate (so that, in reality, most unintended consequences are anticipated or at
least anticipatable), this Special Issue builds up to a question for further research,
namely, the politics and ethics of choosing the unintended consequences that merit
more (urgent) attention and active management. The concluding article by Frank de
Zwart and Karolina Pomorska develops this point further and oﬀers additional reﬂec-
tions on the implications of these ethical dilemmas for policymaking.
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